Knee Deep in the Hooah!

This is a very interesting and insightful 4-part series written by an Infantry soldier (Stryker Brigade) in Baqubah who became involved with the “Sons” shortly after the troop surge hit the Diyala Province. His perspective and story is a little different than what you normally hear regarding the Sons, but I wouldn’t say it’s negative inasmuch as it is honest. Of course the Sons of which he writes are in a specific area of Diyala (Baqubah), and I would imagine that each group of these citizens that come along must be judged according the area, the circumstances in which they formed and their ongoing record of service. I would imagine, as in any newly formed militia, there are going to be noble patriots and those with less than honorable intentions. I will excerpt a small portion of each of the stories and will then link to the referring link that will take you to “False Motivation” where the author, “Toy Soldier,” has all four parts in their entirety. Good reading… enjoy:

Sons of Iraq Part 1:

Excerpt:

[This is going to be a series that I will write in a few parts as it covers several months worth of experiences and interactions. Save your final judgments for the ending]

[Sons of Iraq was] An organization that was a fairly new concept in Baqubah when my unit arrived in August. At the time we called them CLN, standing for Concerned Local Nationals; that of course evolved into a more politically correct name of CLC, Concerned Local Citizens. Now they’ve been renamed, and they’re making headline news from Iraq, the Sons of Iraq are filling the gap that the US Military and Iraqi Military can’t provide, and that is the 24/7 surveillance of hot spot areas. When we first arrived in Baqubah, I was not impressed by the CLN. Far from it in fact, I despised them and what they represented at the time. They were a bunch of out of town thugs for hire, who wanted to play Army and have none of the responsibility. They were established in the wake of Operation Arrowhead Ripper, and their leadership was questionable with rumored ties to a notorious Islamic Extremist group that had partnered with AQI in previous years. Read More

Sons of Iraq Part 2:

Excerpt:

We last left off, with a very dismayed platoon and myself wondering how such a rag tag group of thugs were going to be trained properly. Because off of the difficulty we faced in whipping these criminals into place, we first had to know them and understand their motivations we learned both in our first few visits to their main safe house. We learned that their leader was not from the Baqubah area, but rather resided in Baghdad and had come to Baqubah to “help”. Help with what you ask? That’s what we wanted to know, Operation Arrowhead Ripper had already come through and did a good job of purging the area. The CLN had been a vital asset during that operation, but these were not the same CLN that had operated with US Forces, no they were new comers, vultures, drawn to the pickings that were left after the operation. A city on lock down, with a bunch of innocent people, and a few bad ones. The few bad people were what left the appearance that, while Arrowhead Ripper had indeed made Baqubah a safe area again, Baqubah was still not secure. Hence, the CLN came to save the day; again we saw straight through this veil thrown in front of us. We quickly learned from the populace that the CLN were running wildly around while we were not in sector, threatening families for their valuables, beat people who attempted to speak against them, and some were even working with the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq left in the area. A complete and total disaster to start with. Read More

Sons of Iraq Part 3:

Excerpt:

The idea of the CLC is like a garden, a garden we inherited that had been over run with weeds that were strangling any hope of a decent organization being formed. We had rolled up our sleeves, and went to work, cultivating an organization that would be worth while in it’s efforts and value, but during our weeding process we had found that the roots of these weeds went deeper than we had thought. Finding the picture of the CLC leader with AQI leaders proved to us that there was more work to be done than we had thought.

So our weeding process continued, but we concentrated on the known killers in our garden, building a packet of photos, evidence, and sworn statements so that we could take this weed out roots and all. Finally arresting the CLC leader and establishing a new leader in his stead, we began to see the progress we had wanted with this mob.

Soon, we were opening multiple safe houses all over our company area of operations, making official badges for the CLC so that they could work in an official capacity, we even worked on a way so that they could be paid, adding incentive for good behavior and actions.Read More

Sons of Iraq, Part 4:

(Too short to excerpt:)

Part four is more my final synopsis on the whole Sons of Iraq organization. While I believe it is a good idea in theory, I believe it ultimately undermines our mission here, which is to get the Iraqi Government to stand on it’s own two feet.

Enabling an armed militia to watch neighborhoods makes the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police organizations seem incompetent and takes away from their legitimacy. I do believe we should encourage Iraqi’s to defend their homes and themselves from the terrorists, but forming a civilian force like this (that has ulterior motives) is a short sighted move on our behalf. Original Post

That’s just my .02 cents worth though.

Tags: Army, Terrorism, Troop Surge, combat, deployment, military, politics, veterans, war on terror //